Abstract
Introduction
Dynamic inconsistency problem in monetary policy arises if the policymakers are unable to commit to a policy rule. The dynamic inconsistency literature initiated by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) indicates that policymaking under commitment can lead to substantially better outcome than policymaking under discretion. This literature indicates that the absence of commitment in monetary policy is the main factor in the persistence of high inflation. Therefore, several countries began to adopt inflation targeting starting from early 1990s in order to reduce inflation and achieve price stability.
The main objective in the adoption of inflation targeting is to create an environment where inflation expectations converge to inflation target. Credibility of monetary authority is therefore crucial to manage the inflation expectations in inflation targeting regimes. Higher credibility will lead to lower disinflation costs.
The aim of this paper is to determine which measures of credibility best predict the variations of interest rates in Turkey. For this objective we used monthly data from Turkey between January 2004 and January 2012. Turkey adopted inflation targeting informally in 2002 and formally in 2006 in order to stabilize the price changes.
Nine credibility indices are evaluated in this paper as a measure of the credibility. CI CK is proposed by Cecchetti and Krause (2002) , CI M is proposed by de Mendonça (2007) , CI A is introduced by de Mendonça and Souza (2009), CI RC is introduced by Nahon and Meuer (2009) . CI CVE and CI CVX are proposed in this paper. These indices measure the credibility by considering the deviation of the expected inflation from the inflation target. The last three credibility indices discussed in this paper (CI AR , CI WR , CI MAR ) are based on the reputation (past performance) of the monetary authority. The relationship between variation in interest rate and variation in credibility indices is analyzed. Two different interest rates are used in the analysis: monetary policy interest rate which is mainly determined by the central bank and market interest rate.
We provide empirical evidence supporting the claim that higher credibility will lead to lower variations in interest rates of both monetary policy and the market. We also show that CI CK is the best credibility index in explaining the variations in both policy rate and market interest rate in Turkey.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Credibility measurement and credibility indices are discussed in section 2. Section 3 describes the data and application of the credibility indices for Turkey. Section 4 explains the empirical analysis and section 5 concludes.
Credibility Measurement
As central bank credibility has gained importance in the recent monetary policy literature, measuring the credibility becomes a significant issue. In practice since
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Credibility impact approach is a quantification of credibility effects based on inflation expectations of economic agents (Faust and Svensson, 2001 ). This measure can be quantified either with the deviations of inflation expectations from inflation target or the weight of inflation target in formation of inflation expectations. Inflation expectations may differ depending on the analyzed cohort of the agents. Nahon and Meurer (2009) have used the credibility impact approach to measure the credibility of Brazilian Central Bank under inflation targeting program during the years 2000-2005. They used three indices formerly defined by Cecchetti and Krause (2002) , Sicsu (2002 ), de Mendonça (2004 and proposed two more indices. de Mendonça and Souza (2009) have also measured the credibility of Brazilian Central Bank by using six credibility indices where three of them are based on the reputation of the central bank.
In this study, we mainly use the credibility impact approach to measure the credibility of the Central Bank of Turkey between 2004 and 2012. We describe the credibility indices used in the study in the next sub-section.
Credibility Indices
Following Agenor and Taylor (1993) and Svenson (2000) credibility changes inversely with the distance between inflation expectation (E(π)) and inflation target (π). Thus the credibility indices based on credibility impact approach should represent this relation. Our first credibility index (CI CK ) is proposed by Cecchetti and Krause (2002) . This credibility index takes the values between 0 and 1, assuming full credibility when it is equal to 1.
The index is equal to 1 if the expected inflation is lower or equal to the inflation target. It decreases linearly while the expected inflation departs from the inflation target and gets the value of 0 if the expected inflation exceeds 20%. In this index it is assumed that if the expected inflation exceeds %20, then the central bank loses the control of inflation and thus has no credibility.
The second credibility index (CI M ) is proposed by de Mendonça (2007) which considers the tolerance limits together with the inflation target. It is computed by the following formula where π min and π max represent for the lower and upper bounds of inflation target respectively.
This index equals to 1 if the expected inflation is equal to inflation target and equals to 0 if the expected inflation is either lower than the lower bound inflation target or greater than the upper bound inflation target. If the expected inflation is in tolerance interval, it decreases linearly while the expected inflation differs from the inflation target.
The third credibility index (CI A ) is proposed by de Mendonça and Souza (2009) which assumes that the central bank has full credibility while the expected inflation is in tolerance interval.
CI A takes the value of 1 if the expected inflation is in tolerance interval. It takes the value of zero if the expected inflation is either greater than 20% or less than zero. Otherwise, it decreases linearly while expected inflation departs from tolerance interval and takes a value in the (0,1) interval.
The forth credibility index (CIRC) is suggested by Nahon and Meuer (2009) which assumes that the central bank has full credibility while the expected inflation is lower than the upper bound of inflation target.
CI RC is equal to 1 if the expected inflation is less than upper bound of the inflation target and decreases while expected inflation departs from the upper bound of the inflation target and takes value in the (0,1) interval. It converges to zero while the expected inflation goes to infinite.
We propose two more credibility indices (CI CVE and CI CVX ) in this paper. Similar to CI M , these indices take the value of 1 if the expected inflation is equal to the target inflation and take the value of 0 if the expected inflation is outside of tolerance interval. In the tolerance interval, CI CVE decreases at an increasing rate and CI CVX decreases at a decreasing rate while the expected inflation differs from the inflation target. Thus the slope of CI CVE decreases and the slope of CI CVX increases in the tolerance interval. In other words, CI CVE has a concave shape and CI CVX has a convex shape.
In case of a deviation of expected inflation from inflation target, CI CVX will cause a higher credibility loss than CI M , whereas CI CVE will cause a lower credibility loss than CI M .
Credibility creation approach considers the deviation of the expected inflation from the inflation target. de Mendonça (2007) pointed out that credibility is synonymous with reputation in economies where credibility is still being built. Consequently, de Mendonça and Souza (2009) proposed an alternative method for measuring credibility by using the reputation instead of expectations. Note that reputation is earned due to the past performance of the central bank whereas credibility is gained based on agents' expectations. However, past performance of the central bank can be effective in the formation of expectations and thus reputation can be used in measuring the credibility. In order to build credibility indices based on reputation, we use the reputation index (R) proposed by de Mendonça and Souza (2009).
The reputation index is similar to CI A where expected inflation is replaced with observed inflation (π
OBS
). Reputation index takes the value of 1 if the observed inflation is in the tolerance interval and takes the value of 0 if the observed inflation is less than zero or higher than 20%. Otherwise it is in (0,1) interval and decreases linearly while the observed inflation departs from tolerance limits.
Based on the reputation index three credibility indices (CI AR , CI WR , CI MAR ) are established as follows.
CI is the average reputation at time t (R 0 is equal to initial reputation). 
Credibility Measurement in Turkey

Data and Assumptions
The data used in the analysis were taken from Under secretariat of Treasury, Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) and Istanbul Stock Exchange Markets. The data are in monthly frequencies and belong to the period between January 2004 and January 2012.
Expected inflation has taken from CBRT public surveys comprehending both financial sector and households answers. Even though the data of expected inflation are available for years [2001] [2002] [2003] , the results of CBRT public surveys to determine the expected inflation are not very efficient for this period (Kara and Küçük-Tuğer, 2010) . We therefore do not use the data for years [2001] [2002] [2003] in the analysis.
Inflation targets and observed inflation rates for the years 2003-2011 are given in Table 1 . As inflation targets are decided annually, we transform the end year targets to monthly frequency by using linear interpolation method highlighted in the part "inflation path descriptions consistent with the end-year target and the uncertainty band" under CBRT's monetary policy papers. 
Figure 2: Illustration of Credibility Indices and Reputation Index
Those policy papers have been prepared in advance at the beginning of each year and shared with public for the years 2002-2011. 1 As there was an implicit implementation of inflation targeting program before 2006, those monetary and exchange rate policy papers didn't include inflation paths before that time. Thus, we have assumed that CBRT's policy preference to decrease the inflation to the target levels would be the same before 2006. Moreover, there is no monetary explanation of inflation paths shared with public for 2010 and 2011 as the difference between the inflation targets for those years are small to describe. It is assumed that monetary paths were not parallel with the seasonal price changes generally observed in Turkish economy. However, as CBRT would declare to follow a linear decreasing path for the belonging years we thought that it is meaningful to follow this path for the years in concern. There may be some critics to CBRT's approach. But, a smooth declining path towards the announced target is also an accepted way in inflation targeting literature. Inflation target, expected inflation, observed inflation and the tolerance interval between January 2004 and January 2012 is given in Figure 3 .
As it can be seen in For the policy rate we have used overnight CBRT's interest rate which is also published according to the annually cumulated monthly data. Overnight interest rate was used as policy rate until November 2010 by CBRT. However, they began to use weekly REPO interest rates since December 2010. Thus, we have also included this change in our data set.
For the market interest rate, we have used the average interest rate of the indicator treasury bond that was exchanged mostly in each day by transforming those daily frequencies into annually cumulated monthly averages. 
Application of Credibility Indices for Turkey
The 
Empirical Analysis
As the credibility of the central bank increases, its ability to affect the public expectation is also increases. Thus, it is expected that change in the interest rates will be inversely related to the credibility of the central bank. We analyze the relation between credibility indices and the interest rate. Two different interest rates are used in the analysis. First one is the policy rate which is mainly determined by the central bank and the second one is market interest rate which is the average interest rate of the indicator treasury bond.
In the first step of empirical analysis, unit root tests have been carried out for all of the variables. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Philips-Perron(PP), Dickey-Fuller GLS (DF-GLS) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests are held and the results are shown in Table 2 .
According to ADF and PP tests, all the series are non-stationary at level but stationary at first differences at %1 significance level. However, CI A and CI RC series are stationary at level according to these tests at %5 significance level. On the other hand, KPPS test confirms that CI A and CI RC series are not stationary at level at %5 significance level. 3 We treated all the series in the analysis as I (1) .
If the credibility indices cause changes in interest rates, then we will observe that changes in credibility indices will precede changes in interest rates. To formally analyze the precedence in the movements of credibility indices and interest rates, pair wise Granger causality tests were conducted (see the results in Table 3 )
. Test results shows that D(CI CK ), D(CI M ), D(CI CVE ) and D(CI WR ) Granger causes D(i MAR ) at %1 significance level and D(E(π)-π) Granger causes D(i MAR ) at %5
significance level. On the other hand, the unique credible index whose movements precede the variations in the policy rate is CI CVE which is first proposed in this paper. D(CI CVE ) Granger causes D(i CB ) at %1 significance level.
There is also some evidence of causality from variation in interest rate to changes in credibility for both market and monetary policy interest rates. D ( These results show that changes in monetary policy and the market interest rates precede the variations in the credibility. We performed pairwise Granger causality tests to examine the precedence in the variations market interest rate and policy rate (see Table 4 for the results). It shows that there is bicausality between them. We also analyze the empirical relation between credibility indices and the market interest rate and the empirical relation between credibility indices and the policy rate. In general we make multiple regressions on the following models as proposed in de Mendonça and Souza (2009) .
The first model (eq. 1) expresses the variations in policy rate by using the changes in credibility indices. The difference between expected inflation and target inflation in the previous period is used as control variable in the model. If the variations in policy rate would decrease while credibility is increasing, then an increase in a credibility index should reduce the variations in policy rate. We therefore expect negative and statistical significance coefficients for credibility indices in the estimation of the first model.
For each credibility index we choose the appropriate model by using Akaike and Schwarz information criteria. 4 Estimation results for the variations in policy rate are given in Table 5 . 5 In the estimation of the variation in policy rate, two models (for CI AR and CI WR ) are significant at %5 level and the rest of the models are significant at %1 level.
By comparing the models in terms of adjusted R 2 , we see that the best credibility index is CI CK which accounts for the 39. 2 values lower than %10. In addition to having the highest explanatory power, the model for CI CK has the lowest Akaike and Schwarz information criteria values (1.5521 and 1.6874, respectively) among all models. Thus, we can say that CI CK is the best credibility index in explaining the variations in policy rate. (-1) ).
The second model (eq. 2) explains the variations in market interest rate by using the changes in credibility indices. The variation in market interest rate in the previous period is included in the model as control variable. If the variations in market interest rates move inversely with changes in credibility, then an increase in a credibility index should reduce the variations in market interest rates.
We therefore expect negative and statistical significance coefficients for credibility indices in the estimation of the second model.
We select the appropriate model by using Akaike and Schwarz information criteria for each credibility index. Estimation results for the variations in policy rate are shown in Table 6 . 6 In the estimation of the variation in market interest rate, all of the models with credibility indices are statistically significant at %1 level. By comparing the models in terms of adjusted R 2 , it is seen that the best credibility index is CI CK which explains the 52.75% of the variation in the D(i MAR In addition to having the highest explanatory power, the model for CI CK has the lowest Akaike and Schwarz information criteria values (2.5046 and 2.6407, respectively) among all models. Thus, we can say that CI CK is the best credibility index in explaining the variations in market interest rate.
Conclusion
Credibility of the monetary authority is a crucial indicator that can promise the consistency of the policy decision. It decreases the cost of disinflation under inflation targeting regimes. The measurement of credibility is therefore important for the analysis of countries adopting inflation targeting. This study evaluates nine credibility indices to measure the credibility of central bank of Turkey between January 2004 and January 2012. Six of these indices are based on the deviation of inflation expectation from the inflation target and the rest are based on the reputation (past performance) of the central bank.
